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Internet Services:  An Economic Model of Duopoly Competition Between Internet 
Service Providers 
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Matt E. Thatcher, The University of Arizona, mthatcher@cmi.arizona.edu 
Abstract 
As consumer demand for Internet access and online 
services continues to grow, so does the competition for 
market share (i.e., subscriptions) among Internet Service 
Providers (ISPs).  According to recent surveys consumers 
rate two criteria as most important when deciding to 
subscribe, or continue a subscription, to an ISP: 
• the connection quality provided to consumers by the 
network infrastructure.  The connection quality refers 
to factors such as the accessibility, speed, and 
reliability of the Internet connection.  Connection 
quality depends on the investments made in the ISPs 
network infrastructure (e.g., network bandwidth, 
router switching capacity, and server performance) 
and the number of subscribers served by that 
infrastructure.  Decisions about connection quality 
affect the quality of services and, therefore, consumer 
demand for these services. 
• the price charged by the ISP for access to its Internet 
services.  
In this paper, we develop an economic model, based 
on the well-established model of R&D competition used 
by D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1998) and Amir and 
Wooders (1998), to examine the trade-offs between 
decisions made about investments in connection quality 
and decisions made about pricing the services that result 
from these investments for firms competing in a duopoly 
market for Internet access and services.  More 
specifically, we address the following research questions: 
• How should an ISP determine the optimal investment 
in connection quality (or network infrastructure)? 
• How should an ISP price its services and respond to 
changes in the investment and pricing decisions made 
by competing firms? 
• How will falling technology prices (e.g., for network 
bandwidth, server capacity and performance, and 
other infrastructure technologies) affect the optimal 
investment and pricing decisions by ISPs in this 
market? 
Two key findings in this analysis are that when 
considering a market for Internet services in which  
consumers are more sensitive to differences in price than 
differences in connection quality: 
• Prices charged by ISPs should be positively 
correlated with each other (independent of 
differences in connection quality) 
• Falling technology prices should encourage ISPs to 
invest more heavily in connection quality which will 
result in better access and service quality for 
consumers, but at higher prices.  
The results of the analyses will help decision-makers 
in the Internet services market better understand the 
implications of their investment and pricing decisions on 
consumer demand for services and firm profits. 
1. Introduction 
Recently, growth in consumer demand for Internet 
access and services (e.g., email, personal web space, 
newsgroups, message boards, and chat rooms) has been 
explosive, a trend that is expected to continue over the 
next decade.  In March of 1999, Yankee Group, a market 
research firm, estimated that about 25% of U.S. 
households had access to the Internet.  However, the firm 
also predicted that the percent of U.S. households with 
online access would grow to 33% by the end of 1999 and 
to 66% by the end of 2003 (Fusco, 1999).  In addition, it 
was estimated that over the next five years the online 
services market will grow at a compounded annual rate of 
21% with households spending more than $56 billion on 
Internet access and services during this period. 
Presently, the market for online services is dominated 
by America Online (AOL) which accounted for about 
57% of the U.S. market as of March of 1999.  Three other 
providers, Microsoft Network (MSN), AT&T WorldNet, 
and Earthlink (which recently merged with MindSpring) 
compete for the second position in the U.S. Internet 
access market, accounting for about 6%, 5%, and 4% of 
the market respectively. 
These Internet service providers (ISPs) are competing 
aggressively for U.S. market share with a significant 
focus on targeting and attracting new (or potential) users 
of Internet services.  According to Emily Meehan, analyst 
in the Yankee Group’s Internet Market Strategies practice 
area, “Any company serious about obtaining double-digit 
market share must focus on the newbie market; the 75 
percent of households who have yet to get online.”  In 
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fact, AOL Chief Executive Steve Case has said that even 
AOL is attempting to increase its subscriber base by 
focusing on the “95% of people out there who are not 
subscribers." (Richards, 1999)  Therefore, many ISPs are 
attempting to develop services and pricing strategies that 
will not only attract existing Internet users but also attract 
new users.     
However, for a potential customer of Internet services 
comparing ISPs is often difficult given all of the different 
services and pricing strategies available in the market.  
Several studies have attempted to identify the set of 
criteria that potential customers consider most important 
when deciding whether to subscribe, continue a 
subscription, or discontinue a subscription to an ISP.  In 
particular, PC Magazine surveyed thousands of its 
subscribers to gauge customer satisfaction with their ISP 
(Miller, 1999). 
 Respondents rated price (40%) as the most important 
criteria in choosing an ISP.  Speed of access(33%), 
available local access numbers(29%) and 
reputation(26%), measures related to connection quality, 
followed price as important factors in choosing an ISP1.  
These findings suggest that while respondents are willing 
to pay for improvements in network availability and 
performance.   
However, despite the importance of network criteria in 
customers’ decision making, many ISPs rate poorly along 
these criteria.  In fact, “U.S. Internet users are fed up with 
busy signals, leading to widespread dissatisfaction with 
Internet service providers and higher rates of users who 
switch ISPs” (Weil, 1998).  Based on these observations, 
ISPs attempting to grow market share and attract 
subscribers should focus on developing strategies that 
carefully consider the trade-offs between the quality of 
network services provided to their subscribers and the 
price charged for those services. 
In this paper we develop an economic model to 
examine the trade-offs between investments in connection 
quality and pricing of services for firms competing in a 
duopoly market for Internet access and services.  Section 
2 and 3 further motivate the focus on firm decisions about 
investments in connection quality and pricing of services.  
Section 4 presents the key research questions to be 
examined.  Section 5 presents the model assumptions.  
Section 6 presents the initial model results. Finally, 
                                                          
1
 Telechoice and Inter@active had over 1000 businesses 
complete an ISP Customer Satisfaction Survey in 1998. 
Respondent rated connection availability, network 
performance, and reputation for speed of diagnosis and repair 
as the most important criteria in evaluating an ISP. Price closely 
followed in importance with 80% of the respondents citing price 
as important in choosing an ISP. 
Section 7 concludes the paper and identifies some areas of 
future research.   
2. Investing in Connection-Quality 
ISPs may attract more customers by improving the 
quality of network services provided to subscribers.  The 
connection-quality refers to factors such as the amount of 
up-time and accessibility, speed of Internet access, the 
reliability of connection, the amount of delays or packet 
loss, and the amount of personal web space made 
available to subscribers2.  The connection-quality (and, 
therefore, the quality of network services) depends on the 
ISPs investments in network infrastructure – that is, the 
bandwidth of the network media, the switching capacity 
of routers, and the performance (e.g., disk and CPU 
capacity) of servers used by the ISP3.  Investments in 
these network infrastructure components will generally 
lead to higher user satisfaction.  For example, users desire 
broader network bandwidth (i.e., broadband network 
technology currently enabled by digital subscriber lines 
(DSL), cable-modems, and satellites) to meet their 
growing needs, including support for more dynamic web 
page usage, richer on-line multimedia experiences, and 
faster file downloading and messaging.   
These investments in network and server capacity are 
usually considered fixed, long-term investments because 
it is technically difficult and expensive to increase or 
modify capacity in the short-term.  Once a network 
bandwidth type, such as a 56K telephone line based 
service, has been adopted by an ISP significant 
investments must be made to change to a higher 
bandwidth type such as DSL, cable, or satellite.  For 
                                                          
2
 The Internet uses a technology called packet-switching. 
The term packets (or frames, or cells) refers to the fact that data 
stream from a computer is broken up into packets of about 200 
bytes (on average), which are then sent out onto the network. 
This technology is connectionless, meaning there is no end-to-
end setup for a session; each packet is independently routed to 
its destination.  With current technology, packets are generally 
accepted onto the network on a first-come/first-served basis.  
Routers are devices or softwares in a computer that determines 
the next network point to which a packet should be forwarded 
towards its destination.  When traffic is heavy, the only way the 
Internet can handle the congestion is either by delaying traffic or 
by dropping (or discarding) packets so that some information 
must be resent by the originating software (Mackie-Mason and 
Varian, 1994; Nogueira and Cavalcanti, 1998). 
3
 According to (Odlyzko, 1998): 
“A study carried out in 1997 by Christian Huitema about 
accessing some popular servers showed that 20% were not 
reachable.  Among the 80% that could be reached, 42% of the 
delays were caused by network transmission, with DNS [domain 
name server] accounting for 13% and servers for the remaining 
45%.” 
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example, Excite@home had to sign up with 23 cable TV 
partners in 1999 in order to begin providing cable-based 
services to its subscribers (Nee, 1999).  In response to this 
and similar investments in bandwidth made by 
competitors, AOL announced in January 2000 a merger 
with Time Warner, a media company that owns the U.S.’s 
second largest cable systems; this merger would enable 
AOL to offer similar cable-based services.  Investments 
such as these would generally be considered long-term 
investments. 
One factor affecting an ISP’s decision to invest in 
network infrastructure is the cost associated with these 
investments.  The costs of broader network bandwidth, 
disk and CPU capacity of servers, memory, web space, 
and other infrastructure components have decreased 
dramatically over recent years.  For example, prices for 
DSL service, a form of high-speed connection, are 
declining due in part to competition from cable-modem 
services.  The aggressive launch of the cable-modem 
service, which like DSL offers speeds up to 100 times 
faster than conventional dialup service, has forced DSL 
providers to lower prices. 
However, there is some debate regarding the impact of 
the declining costs associated with these infrastructure 
components on prices charged by ISPs.  On one hand, 
according to David Pine, vice president of cable-modem 
provider Excite@Home, "With cable and phone 
companies, not to mention wireless and satellite 
providers, slugging it out with competing varieties of 
broadband Internet service, consumers can bet on lower 
prices, more features and more innovation." (Woo, 1999).  
Alternatively, declining technology costs may encourage 
ISPs to invest in more network infrastructure than they 
would otherwise, leading to improvements in network 
quality.  This, in turn, may lead to an increase in prices as 
profit-maximizing ISPs attempt to recover their 
investment costs and to take advantage of the increased 
demand for their “faster and more reliable” services.   
3. Pricing Internet Access and Services 
Flat-rate pricing refers to a pricing strategy adopted 
by many ISPs in recent years in which firms charge 
customers a fixed fee for unlimited – or limited – access 
to Internet services.  This has been a common pricing 
strategy among ISPs in the U.S. market since 1996 
(Swisher, 1999; Rafter, 1998).  The fixed-rate charged by 
an ISP depends on: 
• Investments in network infrastructure – Most of the 
costs of providing Internet services are the fixed costs 
associated with the network infrastructure.  The 
incremental cost of sending additional packets (or 
information) is essentially zero if the network is not 
saturated.  Therefore, the size of investment in 
network infrastructure will significantly affect the 
pricing of Internet services. 
• Demand for the ISP’s services – Customer demand 
will also drive prices.  As discussed earlier, demand 
partially depends upon the connection-quality and 
content provided by the ISP (and, of course, the 
price) and consumers’ sensitivity to these factors.   
4. Research Questions 
Therefore, as ISPs attempt to attract more subscribers, 
they must decide how to most appropriately invest in 
connection-quality and how to price the resulting Internet 
services they are offering; as we will see later, these 
decisions involve complex trade-offs.  In this paper, we 
will examine the optimal investment and pricing decisions 
for firms competing in a duopoly market for Internet 
services in which subscribers gain access to these services 
through dial-up modem, DSL, or cable modem.   
More specifically, we develop an economic model to 
address the following research questions derived from the 
discussion above: 
1) How should an ISP determine the optimal investment 
in network infrastructure? 
• This raises the question of whether or not an ISP 
should invest in more bandwidth and better server 
performance.  That is, answering this question should 
help identify whether or not AOL should invest in 
relationships with Time Warner, Bell Atlantic Corp., 
and SBC Communications Inc. to provide DSL and 
cable-modem services or just stay with its existing 
infrastructure of dial-up telephone lines.  
2) How should an ISP price its services and respond to 
changes in the flat-rate prices charged by competing 
ISPs? 
• In 1998, AOL raised its monthly subscription rate by 
$2, from $19.95 to $21.95 (Quistgaard, 1998).  At the 
time, many observers expected competitors to 
quickly follow suit, raising the price of Internet 
access for everyone.  However, after the rate hike, 
most ISPs kept their pricing the same while some 
even lowered their monthly rates to attract more 
subscribers (Heid, 1998).  We will attempt to 
examine such dynamic behaviors in our models. 
3) How will falling technology prices (e.g., for network 
bandwidth, server CPU capacity, memory, and other 
infrastructure technologies) affect ISPs’ investment 
and pricing strategies in this market? 
• As suggested earlier, while some believe that 
declining technology costs should lead to lower 
prices for Internet access, others believe that 
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declining costs will encourage much larger 
investments in infrastructure (and, therefore, network 
quality), leading to price increases to cover the costs 
and accommodate for changes in demand. 
While these questions are important to answer for 
ISPs, research on optimal investment and pricing 
decisions for ISPs has received little attention in the 
information systems and economics literature.  In this 
paper we present an economic model to analyze the 
relationship between investments in connection-quality 
and pricing of Internet services.    
Model Assumptions 
We consider a two-stage model of duopoly 
competition in a market in which each firm provides 
consumers with unlimited Internet access and unlimited 
usage of services at a flat-rate price.  We assume that 
subscribers access these services through dial-up modem, 
DSL, or cable modem4.  In the first stage, the firms 
simultaneously invest in the network infrastructure (e.g., 
network bandwidth and server capacity) that enables and 
supports their service offerings.  This investment 
essentially differentiates the connection-quality offered by 
each firm.  In the second stage, each ISP observes the 
connection quality of its competitor.  Then, based on 
these observations and the demand functions facing each 
firm, both firms simultaneously determine a flat-rate price 
to charge for access to their Internet services5.  The 
services offered by each firm are somewhat differentiated 
(e.g., personalized content, personalized interface, special 
chat rooms, etc.), but can be substituted to some extent.   
To analyze this two-stage game of duopoly we will 
adopt the well-established R&D competition model used 
by D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and Amir and 
Wooders (1998).  We assume complete and perfect 
information in this model; that is, we assume that the 
payoff function for each firm is common knowledge and 
that firms can observe their past decisions and those of the 
competing firm.  These assumptions are reasonable since: 
• The technology investment options available for 
providing Internet access are standardized and the 
costs of technical support and software development 
are common knowledge.  This implies that firms can 
estimate each other’s profit functions.   
                                                          
4
 The assumption of duopoly competition seems reasonable 
since a small number of firms serve a large percent of the 
consumers of Internet access and services.  
5
 As suggested earlier, ISPs typically invest in network 
infrastructure (which is usually considered a fixed cost because 
it is technically difficult and expensive to modify) and then price 
services based on these investments (and consumer demand) 
• ISPs’ investment decisions are generally made public 
to attract investors in the stock market.  In addition, 
market intermediaries typically provide past 
investment information at a low cost.  
The competition between ISPs is analyzed by solving 
subgame perfect equilibria of the two-stage game.  After 
proving the existence of equilibria, we will use static 
analysis to analyze the impact of the model parameters on 
the equilibrium investment and pricing decision made by 
each firm.  
In this two-stage model, Firm 1 faces a demand 
function for its Internet services, Q1, which depends on 
the following: 
• Its own price (p1) and the competing firm’s price (p2) 
– the demand function implies that a decrease in p1 or 
an increase in p2 will increase consumer demand for 
Firm 1’s services. 
• Its investment (k1) in connection-quality and the 
competing firm’s investment (k2) in connection-
quality – the demand function implies that an 
increase in k1 or a decrease in k2 will increase 
consumer demand for Firm 1’s services 
The demand function is symmetric for each firm and 
is assumed to be linear in price and connection quality.  
The demand function for Firm 1 is: 
jijii ckkbppaQ −++−=  
It is assumed that Internet services (e.g., email, 
newsgroups, chat rooms, and instant messaging) offered 
by each firm in the second stage are not perfect 
substitutes; that is, they are differentiated services to some 
extent.  For example, ISPs may provide access to 
personalized content.  The parameter values b (price 
sensitivity) and c (connection-quality sensitivity) attempt 
to capture this dimension.  In addition, a represents the 
size of the market.  These parameter values are assumed 
to be fixed, symmetric across firms, and exogenously 
given.  
The cost function facing Firm 1 exhibits decreasing 
returns to scale in k1 (note that the cost function is 
symmetric for Firm 2).  α is a technology cost coefficient 
characterizing trends in the costs of infrastructure 
technologies.  As the costs to purchase and install broader 
network bandwidth and better server capacity fall over 
time, α becomes smaller; if α approaches zero network 
infrastructure would be free to purchase and install.  v is 
the variable costs per subscription associated with serving 
additional customers; more subscribers require more 
technical support which, in turn, requires more technical 
support assistants and phone numbers.  In this model, we 
will interpret v as the industry standard support level per 
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subscription and we will take it as fixed, symmetric across 
firms, and exogenously given.   
The total cost function is symmetric for each firm.  
The total cost function for Firm 1 is: 
ii
i
i Qv
kC +=
2
2
α  
Finally, the profit function is symmetric for each firm.  
The profit function for Firm 1 is: 
2
))((
2
i
jijiiii
k
ckkbppavp α−−++−−=Π  
Parameter Assumptions:  (i) a > v, (ii) 0 < b, c < 1, and 
(iii) α > 8/9 
The assumption that a > v is trivial but required to 
ensure that optimal investments in connection quality are 
non-negative.  The assumption that 0 < b, c < 1 allows us 
to focus on a market in which a firm’s own investment 
and pricing decisions have a greater impact on consumer 
demand for its services than do the decisions made by its 
competitor.  The final assumption, α > 8/9, ensures that 
the costs of technology are sufficiently large to make the 
firm’s profit function exhibit decreasing returns to scale.    
In addition, when examining this model we will 
assume that consumer demand for Internet access and 
services is more sensitive to changes in price than to 
changes in connection-quality.  We will term this market 
a price-sensitive market. 
Definition:  A market is defined as a price-sensitive 
market if b > 2c 
We assume a price-sensitive market because, even 
though network criteria are important, changes in 
connection-quality are not as salient to consumers of 
Internet services than are changes in price.  That is, 
consumers are typically are not fully informed about the 
connection qualities of each ISP.  In addition, most 
consumers must incur some search costs to find this 
information either from magazines, consumer reports, or 
friends and family.  Without precise information about 
connection qualities, many dial-up ISPs appear to provide 
similar content and features (and typically a standard 56K 
dial-up connection).  However, price differences are 
easier to identify.  Therefore, consumers are likely to be 
more sensitive to changes in price than to changes in 
connection-quality (but consumer demand is still sensitive 
to both in absolute terms).  This may be especially true for 
first-time subscribers to Internet services, an important 
target of many ISPs.  In addition to issues of saliency, the 
analysis of the price-sensitive market is more 
straightforward analytically that that of the connection-
quality sensitive market6.   
5. Model Results 
Based on these assumptions, we will now present the 
subgame perfect equilibrium in the two-stage model of 
duopoly competition7.  In the first stage, the firms 
simultaneously determine levels of connection-quality 
through investments in network infrastructure.  In the 
second stage, each firm observes each other’s connection 
quality; they then simultaneously set flat-rate prices for 
unlimited access to their Internet services.  We will begin 
our analysis in the second stage and identify the 
equilibrium price set by each firm. 
Optimal Pricing Decisions (Stage 2) 
The optimal pricing decisions, p1* and p2*, in stage 2 
given the investment decisions, k1 and k2, made in stage 1 
are: 
2
12
21
*
1 4
)2()2())(2(),(
b
kbckcbvabkkp
−
−+−+++
=
2
21
21
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2 4
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These equations show that in a price-sensitive market 
Firm 1’s Nash equilibrium price, p1*, increases not only 
with  k1 but also with k2; that is, the coefficients for these 
two variables, (b – 2c) and (2 – bc) respectively, are both 
positive given Assumption (ii) and the definition of a 
price sensitive market presented in Section 5.  More 
specifically, these equilibrium price equations imply that 
if Firm 2 makes an incremental investment in connection-
quality (i.e., increases k2) it will also increase p2 to 
compensate for its incremental investment and to respond 
to changes in consumer demand for its improved services.  
However, Firm 1’s profit-maximizing response would be 
to increase its own price, p1 (without making an 
incremental investment of its own).  However, the 
increase in p1 should be less than the increase in p2. This 
is because from the equations we see that: 
∆p2 = (2 – bc)*∆k2  and  ∆p1 = (b – 2c)*∆k2 
                                                          
6
 When considering a price-sensitive market, each subgame 
at the second stage of the two-stage model shows a unique, 
interior, Nash equilibrium.  However, when considering a 
connection-quality sensitive market both interior and boundary 
Nash equilibria exist.  While we have performed the analysis for 
the connection-quality sensitive market, we are unable to present 
the results here due to the complexity of the analytics and the 
space limitations. 
7
 Due to space limitations we are unable to present the 
derivations of these results.  However, they can be obtained by 
contacting the authors. 
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Given Assumption (ii) we know that (2 – bc) > (b – 
2c) which implies that Firm 1 will respond to an increase 
in k2 by increasing its price, p1 (despite making no 
changes to its own connection quality, k1), but by an 
amount less than Firm 2 increases its price.  The intuition 
is that in a price sensitive market Firm 1 has an 
opportunity to increase its margins (by increasing p1) 
while still attracting switchers from Firm 2 (by not 
increasing p1 by too much).  Again, this result relies on 
the assumption that these firms compete in a market in 
which consumer demand is more sensitive to differences 
in price that to differences in connection quality.  
These pricing equations also imply that an increase in 
v, the industry standard variable costs per subscription, 
will lead to an in increase in the equilibrium prices 
charged by both firms, given the investment decisions, k1 
and k2, made in stage 1.  This result is intuitive as the 
firms would need to increase their flat-rate prices to 
compensate for (or cover) the higher variable costs 
associated with providing service and support to 
consumers. 
Optimal Investment Decisions (Stage 1) 
The optimal investment decisions, k1* and k2*, in stage 
1 are: 
)2)(1(2)2)(2(
))1()(2(2
2
*
2
*
1 bccbb
bvabckk
−−−−+
−−−
==
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That is, in equilibrium both firms will invest equally 
in connection-quality in stage 1.  Of course, this also 
implies that both firms will charge the same equilibrium 
price in Stage 2. 
These equations also imply that an increase in v will 
lead to a decrease in the optimal investments decisions, 
k1* and  k2*, made in Stage 1.  This reduction is designed 
to partially offset the positive correlation between v and 
equilibrium prices in Stage 2.  By making a smaller 
investment in stage 1, the firms will “cushion” the impact 
of v on price in stage 2; this result is critical for firms 
competing in a price sensitive market where consumer 
demand is more sensitive to changes in price than to 
changes in connection quality. 
The Impact of α, the Technology Cost 
Coefficient, on Equilibrium Decisions 
A decrease in α implies that advances in technology 
have led to a reduction in computing prices and, therefore, 
a reduction in the costs of purchasing and installing 
network infrastructure.  According to the equations for k1 
and k2 such a decrease would encourage firms to increase 
their investments in connection quality in stage 1 (as 
implied by the positive α in the denominator of these 
equations and shown in Figure 1); in fact, firms increase 
their investments, k1 and  k2, so much that their total 
investment costs increase despite the reduction in α.  In 
turn, this will imply an increase in prices charged (see 
Figure 2), and an increase in profit earned, for both firms 
in stage 2.  The intuition is as follows: as α decreases, an 
increase in connection quality will now have a smaller 
affect on pricing decisions made in stage 2 (although the 
effect is still positive).  This will encourage firms to 
increase their investment in connection quality to increase 
their profits in stage 2.  This result suggests that as 
investments costs, such as those associated with changing 
a 56K modem connection to a cable-modem connection, 
decline that this market will result in better connection 
quality for consumers, but at higher prices.  
Figure 1. Impact of decreasing technology cost on 
connection quality 
tec hnology  cos t c oeffic ient
connec tion 
quality
 
Figure 2. Impact of decreasing technology cost on 
price 
       
technology  c os t  coeffic ient
price
 
7. Future Research 
In this paper we examined a two-stage model of 
duopoly competition in a market in which each firm 
provides consumers with unlimited Internet access and 
unlimited usage of services at a flat-rate price.  Two key 
findings in this analysis are that when considering a 
market for Internet services in which consumers are more 
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sensitive to differences in price than differences in 
connection quality: 
• Prices charged by ISPs should be positively 
correlated with each other 
• Falling technology prices should encourage ISPs to 
invest more heavily in connection quality which will 
result in better access and service quality for 
consumers, but at higher prices.  
The results of the analyses will help decision-makers 
in the Internet services market better understand the 
implications of their investment and pricing decisions on 
consumer demand for services and firm profits. 
In future research we plan several model extensions to 
better account for complexities (e.g., alternative pricing 
strategies) in the market for Internet services.   In 
addition, we will develop models to address the following 
research questions: 
1) How will the results presented in this paper change if 
the market is assumed to be a connection-quality 
sensitive market (i.e., b < 2c) as opposed to a price 
sensitive market (i.e., b > 2c)?   
• Changing this assumption will lead to a very different 
set of results than presented in this paper and, 
therefore, a very different set of prescribed strategies 
for profit-maximizing ISPs.  We will examine these 
critical differences in detail in future research.  
2) Under what conditions will an ISP decide to offer 
free Internet access and services to the market? 
• Since 1998, the market for Internet access and 
services has seen the emergence and growth of free 
ISPs – that is, firms that offer customers access to 
Internet services for free (e.g., NetZero, 
Blulight.com, iFreedom.com, and WorldSpy).  Most 
of these firms earn profits through advertising 
subsidies – that is, by charging sponsors fees for 
online advertising space (e.g., advertising banners or 
windows).  We will address the emergence of free 
ISPs in more detail in future research.  More 
specifically, we will examine the conditions under 
which offering free Internet access and services will 
be an equilibrium strategy.  More specifically, we 
will attempt to characterize the advertising subsidy 
that must be provided to sustain this strategy in 
equilibrium. 
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